Last 7 February the Financial Times cited a document, produced inside the offices of Javier Solana, the EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, which stated that within a limited timeframe Iran will be able to enrich uranium to such a level as to develop an armaments program. Solana’s staff added, however, that the document was a ‘general reflection’ on Iran that also included observations on human rights and regional security. Obviously Tehran’s nuclear program was taken into consideration. In any case the document resulted in raising concerns inside the European Parliament.Iran is a signatory of the Non Proliferation Agreement and as such is subject to inspections on the part of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). While Tehran maintains that a civil nuclear program is indispensable (in accordance with the NPA) the west believes that in reality Iran’s intentions are to develop atomic energy for military purposes. Thus, according to European governments, the prospective is unacceptable given that:

• it would bring about further changes in the already unstable middle east and world scenarios;
• Israel would be within reach of a nuclear attack on the part of a country that has explicitly demonstrated it’s hostility (Iran has missiles with sufficient reach);
• it would create a domino effect, a regional and international rush for nuclear arms.

The international community’s opinions and positions are diverse. It is, however, possible to divide them into three principal groups: USA/Israel, China/Russia, and the European Union. Over and above these categories it is important to bear in mind support for Iran on the part of the non-aligned countries who believe that the development of a civil nuclear program, in accordance with the NPA, is feasible (see the Havana Declaration of September 2006).

A brief examination of the USA’s diplomatic history in the Middle East is sufficient to understand the negative stance that the Washington-Tel Aviv axis has taken in regards to Iran’s nuclear program (it is worth noting that the initial input to Iran’s nuclear program was given in the 50’s by the USA). Today Iran is considered a major threat to American national security. Diplomatic relations between the two countries do not exist (the same holds true between Israel and Iran), and an economic sanctions regime has been implemented (a policy that proceeds the recent UN resolution 1737 which bans Iran from importing nuclear and military technology). Albeit that the majority of analysts believe that military intervention would be inefficient (the most popular theory is one of air-strikes against known nuclear sites, similar to actions taken in 1981) the USA and Israel do not exclude this option from the various theories that have been discussed.

On the contrary the Russian and Chinese position is more favourable to Iran’s nuclear program. The two powers (both permanent members of the UN Security Council) maintain significant economic and energetic ties to Iran, notwithstanding this neither have vetoed the 1737 resolution (some sources maintain that one of Russia’s motives is the fact that the Bushehr reactor, financed by Moscow, was excluded from the embargo on nuclear imports).

At this point it is interesting to consider the European Union’s diplomatic role in the affair. The EU has collaborated with Iran on the basis of ‘comprehensive dialogue’. This includes: a commercial and cooperation agreement (June 2002) that placed the EU as Iran’s principal commercial partner, discussions in regards to the prospective for peace in the Middle East, the non proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, human rights, the fight against terrorism and narcotics, and the question of the Afghani refugees. All considered the worsening of social-political conditions in Iran has led to focusing attention on the country’s nuclear program, something that was already an issue of importance in 2002 after Iran’s admissions regarding attempts to enrich uranium (one of two ways of producing fissile material for nuclear purposes).

The mediation of the EU-3 (United Kingdom, France, and Germany along with the participation of Javier Solana’s office) began in October 2003 through offering Tehran a packet of economic incentives and requesting, in exchange, the suspension of Iran’s uranium enrichment activities. The so-called Paris Agreement (November 2004) contributed to the temporary suspension of the enrichment program, in exchange the EU-3 proposed the supply of fissile material as a guarantee of the peaceful intentions of Iran’s nuclear program.

However in August 2005 Iran began enrichment activities again thus breaking the pacts made in Paris. In February 2006 the IAEA voted in favour of referring Iran to the UN Security Council (the reason being tied to nonconformity with the Agency). This measure found backing from a part of the EU-3 and the United States. Two months later the Iranian President, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, announced that Iran had successfully concluded it’s enrichment experiments (3% enrichment, considered sufficient for civil use, had been obtained). In the meantime the question had been passed to the attention of the UN Security Council who, on 23 December, chose to impose economic sanctions.

As things stand the role of the UE-3 represents a balanced measure in the context of non proliferation of nuclear materials and technology, one which combines a ‘two-track’ approach (incentives and disincentives) while requesting in exchange the suspension of uranium enrichment activities (fissile material could be supplied from abroad, as opposed to developed internally as is desired by the Government in Tehran). The strategy represents a balanced ‘half way house’, however one that has been interrupted by Solana’s document which seems to pose a number of questions that demonstrate a level of scepticism close to the position of the neo-cons in Washington.

The Iran question is extremely controversial and a number of the contradictions in regards to nuclear non-proliferation as a strategic international political issue seem to converge in it. Iran has officially declared that it intends to proceed in it’s civil program, motivating the decision in terms of having to diversify energy sources in view of expected economical and population growth. In addition to this Tehran maintain that it has a right to do so according to the NPA. All considered the dual-use characteristics of nuclear technology allow room for serious doubt in regards to Iran’s real intentions. To compound fears Iran has medium-range (2.000-2.200 km) Shahab-3 ballistic missiles, supports Hezbollah in the Lebanon, makes ample of anti-Israeli rhetoric and has proclaimed that the State of Israel will soon be cancelled from the face of the earth. A look at the geopolitics of the Middle East make Tehran’s motives for desiring nuclear weapons even clearer. The strategies that he USA has enacted throughout the region give legitimacy to Iran’s request and desire for defensive security.

The results obtained by the EU-3 to date are scarce and Solana’s declarations risk reducing the legitimacy of the attempts by the three European powers, thus undermining the already fragile credibility of European defence and security policies.

The ‘two-track’ approach has resulted in Iran’s being able to continue in it’s atomic program, making any eventual American military attack even more difficult. A possible solution for the EU-3 could be the greater focusing of attention on how to internationalise Iran’s nuclear ambitions (for example inducing Tehran to reopen negotiations with the IAEA).

It has to be remembered that Iran’s stated reason for it’s quest for energy diversity is in order to allow greater economic growth; to deny this, through the fear of a military program, would only increase the hatred on the part of Iranian society towards those who negate Tehran’s legitimate rights.

The Government of the United States is more than ever exposed to the prospects of dubious results from any military action. Analysts talk in terms of regional sabre-rattling. Military intervention is possible but most certainly not desirable. Any similar action would lack international support, both on the part of the pro-western elements inside Iran’s military forces and on the part of Congress. In addition to this some analysts believe that any attacks could be easily repaired over a short space of time, especially those provoked by air-strikes against the nuclear plants.

The Iranian crisis has created enormous difficulties for the diplomatic attempts of the EU-3, as demonstrated by the document made public by the Financial Times. Solana’s document presents a number of important reflections on the Iranian question but risks becoming ulterior support for the idea of a military attack. An attack of dubious consequences and one that finds very little support from Europe’s political forces.