During the meeting in January of the heads of state and government of the African Union (AU), president of the Comoros, Mohamed Sambi, underlined his skepticism of the effectiveness of an international intervention capable of mediating the political and institutional crisis brought forth by the latest secession attempt by the island of Anjoun. The first military intervention by the African Union took place on March 12 while President Bacar (unlawfully placed back in power by elections that were not recognised neither by the nation of the Comoros nor by the African Union), having previously asked that the elections be repeated under free and open conditions, continued to reject attempts at mediation and has refused to call for new elections.

The armed offensive, led by the government of the Union of the Comoros and diplomatically backed by the U.S. and France, is supported by an AU contingent deployed to minimize collateral damage caused by the offensive and made up of troops sent by Tanzania, Libya, Sudan and Senegal. Faced with the worsening of the state of events, Bacar has declared himself ready to open talks, with the possible mediation of South African president Mbeki who condemned the option of the military intervention undertaken. The federal government has nevertheless refused the proposal, announcing the onset of a military campaign backed by the AU. It is must be stressed that for the African Union, traditionally a peacekeeping entity active on the entire African continent, this is the first participation in a military offensive.

While the the country continues to be defined by its lack of clarity regarding the diplomatic relations between the central federal government and its autonomous islands, the political stability of the Comoros Union, a necessary condition for economic development, still seems a far off goal. In this context, the AU plays, and will continue to do so, a fundamental and necessary role, not only for the quick resolution of the crisis (due to its military support and the consensus within the population from which it benefits) but also in the successive role it will play in the stabilisation and political reconstruction that will follow.

Massimo Corsini

The Pentagon has disclosed the resignation of Admiral William Fallon, head of the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), after an interview given to the Financial Times in which he openly announced his opposition to the involvement of U.S. troops under his command in missions on Iranian territory. The awkward situation created after the publication of the article and the public perception of differences of opinion between the admiral and the White House, made his resignation necessary because, according to Fallon, the differences between CENTCOM and President Bush could have proved dangerous concerning the events in countries around the world in which U.S. troops are deployed.

The news of the admiral’s resignation has created a significant stir in Washington and in circles close to the Pentagon, even though for some time, his remarks pertaining to a possible U.S. attack on the Iranian nuclear program were unwelcomed because the statements defined another U.S. military intervention in the region not only useless but also down right “harmful”. CENTCOM troops, currently engaged in Afghanistan and Iraq, are also stationed in the Persian Gulf for the purpose of patrolling the Strait of Hormuz, and it is thought by many that the Pentagon would plan an air strike against Iran led by these Gulf troops.

The decision made by Fallon could prove to be advantageous to the White House in the event that the military option against Iran were to be exercised, an option that, in recent days, both President Bush and Vice President Cheney declared to be still open. The U.S. presidential spokesperson, Dana Perino, announced in an official meeting that policy regarding Iran will not change, clarifying that no one within the administration wants war against Teheran. These announcements seem to confirm that which many analysts have believed for some time, that the White House is using the military option only as a measure to pressure diplomatic negotiations between Iran and the U.S. (see: United States: possible military intervention in Iran?)

Considering the results of the elections in the countries of the ayatollahs and the upcoming presidential election in the United States, the results of which could lead to significant changes in diplomatic relations between Washington and Teheran, a U.S. military intervention against Iran seems unlikely at this time.

Simone Comi

Pakistan’s new parliament convened for the first time today, November 17, and in the next few days the new prime minister should be elected. The choice belongs to the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), the party of the late Benazir Bhutto who received most of the consensus at the last elections. In Pakistan it is generally the leader of the winning party that covers the position of prime minister, but in this case it will not be possible seeing as Asif Ali Zardari, Benazir Bhutto’s widower and political heir, not being a member of parliament, is ineligible. The assassination of Bhutto occurred after the completion of the nomination, but before the tragic event, Zardari was not directly involved in the politics.

At any rate, though the choice belongs to the PPP, the new prime minister will have to be a person also favoured by Pakistan’s second party, the Pakistan Muslim League – N (Nawaz), with which the government coalition will have to be formed. It will certainly not be Nawaz Sharif, leader of the PML-N, as he is also not a member of parliament. Until recently, vice president of the PPP ,Makhdoom Amin Fahim was favoured, but Zardari would have opposed his election.

Regarding the formation of the new government, an agreement between Adif Ali Zardari and Nawaz Sharif is likely to have been already reached. The PML-N has appealed to certain strategic ministries such as the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Finance. The distribution of ministries between the two parties should occur based on proportional criteria agreed upon by the two leaders. The PPP will have 54% of the seats in the federal cabinet while the PML-N will obtain 40% of them. The ministries should number 15, at least during the first phase, and then expand to 20 in total. In any case, the Pakistani government will not make life easy for President Musharraf, no matter who end up leading it. It is sufficient to keep in mind that the two parties in the majority have already decided to reinstate, within 30 days from today, certain Supreme Court judges that Musharraf deposed before the elections.

Asian Pacific Desk

Last Tuesday, Serbian president Boris Tadic accepted the government’s proposal to dissolve its parliament following irreconcilable differences of various factions of the majority on the subject of the Kosovo issue. Elections have been scheduled for May 11, seeing as the president believes the way to deal with the issue is to allow the people to decide on a question of vital importance for country’s future.

The position of President Tadic, clearly pro-European, has strongly clashed with the nationalistic policies of Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica that, nevertheless, was unable keep the majority unified. In fact, according to Tadic, recognition of Kosovar independence would give a notable boost to the Serbian economy, permitting it to integrate itself into the European market and to attain significant influence regarding the future of the newborn country. The prime minister maintains that the recognition of Kosovar independence by some EU countries (18 of a total of 27) is completely illegal and depends on the support of China and Russia (by means of the UN) that, as far as they are concerned, fear that recognition of Kosovo could spur world minorities to declare unilateral independence.

It was inevitable that a situation of such international importance would divide the country and the government cabinet members themselves, considering the significant pressure of the European Union by means of EU Commissioner for Enlargement, Olli Rehn, who considers the future round of elections either a true referendum on the will of the country to become part of the EU or rather a will to turn their economic and politics interests toward an alliance with Russia. Is must not be forgotten that Russia has recently increased its economic interests in Serbia with strategic investments by Gazprom. It is therefore necessary to expect an electoral campaign dominated by the Kovoso issue, an issue that truly represents a key question regarding the long term development of Serbia.

Massimiliano Costa

Parliamentary elections took place in the Islamic Republic of Iran on March 14, elections in which 4500 candidates ran for the 290 seats of the Majlis. In regards to the technical breakdown of the seats, of the 290 at stake, 260 will have to be granted to those outside of Tehran, 5 of which are reserved for religious minorities (Christians, Jews and Zoroastrians). Concerning the outcome of the elections, according to the partial results disseminated by the news agencies (data that will eventually be recalculated with results released by the Ministry of the Interior), victory has gone to the conservatives. It is believed that around 70% of seats will yet again fall into the hands of the conservative party.

Various political questions tied to the elections, however, do not seem to be resolving themselves with the poll results. First of all, there is a considerable amount of controversy regarding the procedures used in the electoral campaign (lasting just 7 days), as well as the expulsion of various influential Reformist figures from their party’s ticket. Secondly, although the reformists have admitted their defeat, they have also managed to attain the majority of seats in comparison to the out going parliament. It is supposed that they will be able to receive 50% of the electoral seats, figuring in those that will participate in the second ballot at the end of April, those most voted that have not received at least 25% of the votes in every district.

Finally, the very same conservatives haven’t appeared to be united from the moment that the conservatives in Tehran divided into two clusters: the United Fundamentalist Front, closer to President Mahmud Ahmadinejad and the Broad Popular Coalition of Fundamentalists, backed by the ex nuclear negotiator, Ali Larijani and the mayor of Tehran, Mohammad-Baqer Qalibaf. Both appear to be intent on preparing the ground work for a presidential challenge against Ahmadinejad in 2009. Based on these recent electoral results, the preferred candidate would be the very same Larijani.

Donatella Scatamacchia


Translation by Marco Zanelli